Payment by results In development aid: All that glitters is not gold by Clist, Paul
1 
 
Payment By Results In Development Aid: 
All That Glitters Is Not Gold 
Paul Clist 
School of International Development 
University of East Anglia 
 
Abstract: Payment by Results, where aid is disbursed conditional upon progress 
against a pre-agreed measure, is becoming increasingly important for various donors. 
There are great hopes that this innovative instrument will focus attention on ultimate 
outcomes, and lead to greater aid effectiveness by passing the delivery risk on to 
recipients. However, there is very little related empirical evidence, and previous 
attempts to place it on a sure conceptual footing are rare and incomplete. This article 
collates and synthesises relevant insights from a wide range of subfields in economics, 
providing a rich framework with which to analyse Payment by Results. I argue that 
the domain in which it dominates more traditional forms is relatively small and if it is 
used too broadly, many of the results it claims are likely to be misleading. The 
likelihood of illusory gains stems from the difficulty of using a single indicator to 
simultaneously measure and reward performance: ‘once a measure becomes a target, 
it ceases to be a good measure’. This does not mean PbR should not be used (indeed it 
will be optimal in some settings), but it does mean that claims of success should be 
treated with caution.  
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1. Introduction 
How should development aid be given? Recently, a new answer to this question has been 
proposed: Payment by Results (PbR) where aid is disbursed contingent upon verified success 
against pre-agreed measures. While relatively new, PbR resembles several previous attempts 
to introduce conditionality into aid giving. Similar to traditional conditionality, it defines new 
and specific goals at the beginning of the agreement. Similar to selectivity, it only disburses 
aid to recipients that have already met conditions; promises of future actions are not enough. 
PbR differs because the results already achieved directly determine the amount of aid 
disbursed. For example, governments have been paid by donors for each additional child 
completing primary education or for each vaccination given. Likewise, NGOs have been paid 
for the number of functioning wells or the additional number of students meeting a set 
learning outcome.   
This new modality has already been adopted by several donors, and is being used with 
recipients of very different sizes, from national governments to small NGOs. The UK’s 
Department for International Development (2014a, p12) state that they are using PbR by default 
wherever it offers best value for money, with 71% of centrally-issued contracts having some 
performance-based element. In 2012 the World Bank approved its Program for Results as its 
first new modality in 30 years. Other prominent examples include GAVI’s use of performance-
based funding formulas, the Asian Development Bank’s pilot of Results-Based Lending, The 
Inter-American Development Bank’s Results-based Loans and The European Commision’s 
Variable Results Tranche (see Perakis and Savedoff, 2015).  
While there is genuine excitement around the idea, it has rarely been robustly analysed. 
Almost every donor that has agreed some sort of PbR has invented its own terminology and 
the plethora of related and overlapping ideas have helped to create a general intellectual fog. 
However, while the idea is innovative and the empirical evidence base is weak, there are a 
host of relevant insights from contract theory, behavioural economics and development 
economics. Together, these provide a rich framework with which to analyse whether PbR 
agreements are likely to be more effective than alternatives. These insights relate to three main 
aspects of a PbR agreement: the agent, the measure and the principal.  
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The Principal-Agent Model is the main tool for understanding which characteristics of the 
agent (aid recipient) determine whether a PbR contract should be used. It focuses on the 
imbalance between the donor and recipient in terms of priorities (how much the specific goal 
is shared) and information (as the donor can only observe the recipient from afar). The 
fundamental question for the donor is whether the PbR contract offered is enough to 
incentivise the recipient to comply with the donor’s wishes, at a price that is still more efficient 
than a block transfer. How the recipient perceives the contract is thus important, and 
determined by characteristics such as their aversion to risk or loss.  
The important features of the measure are best understood using the multitask model, which 
highlights the fact that any measure upon which performance is contracted will be a proxy. 
The model illustrates why it is not enough for the measure to be highly correlated with the 
underlying goal before it is chosen: it must remain so afterwards. This simple insight helps 
inform donors when PbR contracts will be appropriate. Without this understanding, there is 
a high likelihood that success will be measured even when it is not present. Even more 
worryingly, the conditions under which this success will be revealed as ‘fool’s gold’ are rare.  
Good measures are difficult to find, but they should be a prerequisite for any PbR contract.  
The characteristics of the principal (aid donor) have an influence on whether the theoretical 
models discussed elsewhere resemble the real situation. Development economics has 
documented donors’ experience with conditionality in the past (Svensson, 2000; Koeberle, 
2003), and generally found that donors have found it difficult to impose their own conditionsi. 
PbR contracts have legal frameworks which may actually bind donors, but history suggests 
that these constraints could be sidestepped (e.g. by the donor disbursing the funds using a 
different aid instrument). The time frame is also a binding constraint for some donors, who 
will not be able to commit over a long enough period for real results to be achieved. This 
article proceeds by analysing the three components of a PbR contract (Agent, Measure and 
Principal) in sections 2-4, with section 5 discussing and section 6 concluding.  
2. Agent 
The Principal-Agent (P-A) model is a useful workhorse for generating and organising relevant 
insights from several fields, most notably contract theory (see Azam and Laffont, 2003, for a 
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well-known application to the donor-recipient relationship and Savedoff, 2010, for an 
application to results-contingent aid). Imagine a donor (the principal) is about to commit aid 
to a recipient country or NGO (the agent). The donor can typically choose between a fixed 
transfer (say General Budget Support or core funding) and a variable PbR contract, where at 
least some of the aid is disbursed in line with measured performance against some baseline. 
If the donor and recipient are in complete agreement about how the aid should be spent, a 
straight transfer is more efficient as it avoids delays in disbursement, uncertain payments and 
verification costs. In the P-A model, the fundamental benefit of the PbR contract for the donor 
is that it changes the incentives for the recipient, by linking money to specific measures. This 
logic underpins conditionality in Cash Transfers (Das, Do and Ozler; 2005) and salary schemes 
(Hasnain, Manning and Pierskalla; 2014), where monetary incentives are provided in order to 
newly incentivise a different set of activities for an individual. In the same way, donors will 
tend to prefer PbR contracts in cases where they perceive low alignment of preferences.  
What kind of recipients suit PbR contracts?  
While the uncertainty of the PbR payment means that it can incentivise different activities, it 
also means that payments are perceived differently from fixed value contracts.  Recipients 
treat any potential earnings cautiously, discounting them for risk, volatility and time. Each of 
these discounts have an effect on whether the PbR contract is suitable, as they lower the 
effective monetary rewards for success. Say, for example, that a recipient expects a $10 million 
transfer with 50% chance. If the recipient is risk neutral, it would value that contract at $5 
million. However, most recipients of aid transfers are risk averse, and so the effective value of 
the contract may be substantially below the $5 million figure. The more risk averse the agent, 
the greater the discount. This may have effects on the number and effort of bidders for any 
contract, as the perceived rewards are reduced. In general, smaller agents or organisations 
will be more risk averse (Miller and Singer Babiarz, 2013) as a set transfer will be a larger 
portion of their budget and their activities will tend to be more concentrated and volatile. In 
the UK context, PbR contracts have deterred smaller providers from bidding for government 
contracts (Audit Commission, 2012, p.16). In this case the donor could either accept that some 
recipients will not be incentivised (reducing the number of potential recipients) or increase 
the promised transfer (reducing value for money).  
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The recipient’s aversion to ambiguity and volatility work in very similar fashion to their risk 
aversion: a recipient may discount a potential PbR transfer because the chance of it occurring 
is unknown, and may be a volatile source of funds. Barder (2009, p.4) argues strongly that 
unpredictability is not a valid criticism of PbR: “... these concerns are... completely unfounded.  
Levels of school completion are much less volatile, from one year to the next, than traditional 
aid flows.” Barder's defence is within the context of a 5-10 year agreement with a government 
based on school completion rates, and in this context the suggested comparison seems fair - 
ambiguity aversion here should compare volatility in traditional aid to that based on results. 
While aid volatility is a valid comparison for long-term PbR contracts with governments, it is 
not clear what the appropriate comparison is for PbR contracts with NGOs or shorter 
agreements. The nagging concern is that volatile income streams are used less efficiently as 
they cannot be incorporated into long term plans, leading to more short-term thinking.  
A more nuanced role is played by the recipient’s loss aversion (where a recipient weighs losses 
of a given magnitude more than equal gains), as it simultaneously works in different 
directions. Loss aversion decreases the relative attractiveness of the contract (compared to a 
fixed alternative) at the same time as lowering the necessary incentive power. For the former 
effect, loss aversion would mean that recipients would place a greater weight on situations 
where effort has been expended but no results have been measured (due to misfortune or 
problems with the measure). This loss would be felt more keenly, and so a larger reward (in 
cases of success) would be needed to compensate the recipient. For the latter effect, Koszegi 
(2014) explains that loss aversion increases the effective power of any given incentive, as 
downswings are felt more intensely. Koszegi uses this insight to explain why two-level 
incentive contracts (i.e. either a bonus is given or not) are sufficient to incentivise effort for 
loss averse agents. The implication for PbR contracts is that even low-powered incentives (e.g. 
5% of a budget is subject to performance-related disbursement) could have large effects on 
behaviour, as small losses will be magnified.   
These theoretical reasons as to why recipients may perceive a PbR contract differently have 
been seen in various settings. For example, Coffey (2016, p.14) report that several 
organisations that were initially interested in bidding for work in the education sector as part 
of the Girls Education Challenge Fund pulled out once they realised the implications of the 
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PbR contract. The reasons given include the need to finance the work up front, with PbR 
payments subject to the various discounts discussed in this section (risk, loss, volatility and 
time). A further reason was simply the time needed to understand the funding mechanism: 
the rewards on offer did not adequately compensate NGOs for the time cost of understanding 
the contract. A similar message was found by Ssengooba et al (2012), who examined a pilot of 
performance based contracting in the Ugandan health sector. They report that the initiative 
was underfunded: the resources on offer were not enough to incentivise recipients to invest 
time and resources in understanding and affecting the various performance measures.  
Recipients also differ in the extent to which they discount the future, with higher discounts 
making PbR contracts less attractive. Barder (2009, p.6) makes the point that PbR contracts 
with recipient governments take investments that will have positive social returns over the 
long run, and translates them into positive fiscal returns in the short run. The envisaged PbR 
investments are often attractive investments in and of themselves, but the time preferences of 
the recipient country are such that the long-term effects are not sufficiently attractive because 
of the short-term nature of the recipient government - their discount rate for future benefits is 
large. The logic is attractive but once we have acknowledged that the agent has a substantial 
discount rate it is not obvious that results-contingent aid solves the problem. While it seeks to 
foreshorten the time between investments and social returns, when considering it as an 
alternative to standard project or program aid we can see that costly investments are now 
needed before benefits are realised. With the standard aid contract the recipient government 
receives a transfer, makes an investment and then reaps the social returns at a later date. With 
PbR, the timing of the investment and aid transfer are reversed, and so the aid transfer is time-
discounted. In other words, agents that are more short-term will tend to find PbR contracts 
less attractive.  
The time dimension is also relevant because agents may be naïve, meaning that they fail to 
accurately predict their own future preferences or capabilities (De la Rosa, 2011; Gervais, 
Heaton and Odean, 2011). For example, an NGO or government may be overconfident 
regarding their ability to undertake some action. In this case the donor would agree a contract 
with apparently good terms, only for the recipient to later realise the true situation and not 
undertake the action. In cases where a competitive bidding process is allied with an output-
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based contract this bias could be prevalent, because of the winner's curse. Since large groups 
tend to get the value of an item right on average, it follows that those who valued it more than 
average also overvalued it. The auction set-up thus reinforces the difficulty of naiveté as the 
principal incurs a cost as the agent (who overvalued the contract in relation to his costs) may 
be unable to deliver the contract.  
Intrinsic Motivation and the Costs of Control  
While the caricatured economist may believe that money is the only motivator and the P-A 
model the only relevant framework, economics has long recognised that things are not so 
simple. For example, Akerlof’s (1982) observed that firms often pay wages that are higher than 
they absolutely need to, and that workers in response often expend more effort than needed. 
He explained this as a gift exchange such that the worker feels an inherent obligation or desire 
to provide a degree of effort that corresponds to the salary. Since these early insights a large 
body of related literature has examined issues of effort and payment, using many different 
terms. Many of these insights are relevant for PbR contracts in an aid setting. Here, I will 
discuss strategic ambiguity, intrinsic motivation and the costs of control. 
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) argue that many contracts are less complete than might be 
expected; a rational decision they term strategic ambiguity. The ambiguity in contracts is useful 
because of two assumptions: a) performance may be observable but non-verifiable (i.e. both 
parties know when a clause has not been met, but there is sufficient noise that it would be 
difficult to enforce in a court) and b) that all elements of the relationship are strategic. The key 
insights for PbR are that a transparent payment rule precludes an ability to respond to broader 
signals regarding the effort, need and ability of the agent (at the very least to the extent of the 
money committed). It may be the case that the control gained by a contract is outweighed by 
the loss of the ability to strategically respond to the situation.  
To further develop this argument, imagine that a donor wishes to contract contingent on 
governance for which there are many possible performance measures, all of which are flawed 
(as discussed in the next section). All would distort incentives in some way if used as the sole 
measure (e.g. sham elections could be held to comply in name-only, or a complicit auditing 
firm could be hired). In this setting, strategic ambiguity offers several advantages. The agent 
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does not know exactly which performance measure will be used, but does know that future 
contracts will be rewarded on the basis of past performance, and that the principal's true 
concern is, for example, governance. The agent's best response to this situation is to focus on 
related reforms. In this case, there is little distortion in incentives as the agent is focused on 
gaining future contracts but expends little energy in affecting specific indicators. The agent's 
response to this situation would depend upon the principal's ability to choose wisely amongst 
the agents, and the regularity of contracting.  
Prima facie, one may think that adding extrinsic (financial) incentives to intrinsic motivation 
would be a sensible combination. However, there is a body of evidence that states extrinsic 
motivation can crowd out intrinsic motivation (see Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel; 2011). 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) showed that when small fines were introduced for parents in 
Israel who were late to pick up their children from day care, the number of parents showing 
up late increased. This is explained by a shift from intrinsic motivation where arriving late is 
not fair on the employees, to a market orientation where payment of the fine entitles the parent 
to arrive late. In this case the extrinsic motivation was not additional to intrinsic motivation, 
but replaced it. The P-A model emphasises that the donor should use PbR contracts more in 
cases where the recipients undervalue the donor’s goals. However, the agent’s own goals and 
preferences may interact with the PbR contract, and so it is likely that a PbR contract may have 
a lower additional incentive effect for agents who partly share the donor’s goals. This 
emphasises that agents with low alignment with the donor’s own goals are more suitable for 
PbR contracts.  
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) provide laboratory evidence of what they term the hidden costs of 
control. In the experiment a principal is allowed to set a minimum performance requirement 
for the agent. Standard economic theory would predict this minimum would be sensible to 
enforce, and that it would have only beneficial effects. However, when principals did enforce 
this minimum threshold, agents' performance was lower. This is explained as a response to a 
signal of distrust from the principal. In cases where the agent was allowed to choose any effort 
level, performance was higher. Agents in this setting appear to be control averse. The degree of 
monitoring and the sense of fairness appear to be crucial in the literature (Dickinson and 
Villeval, 2008). With all of the above there is some way to go before such insights can be 
9 
 
applied easily to the PbR setting, as most of the empirical work has used individuals rather 
than organisations. However, the conclusion from the body of evidence is that the use of 
performance-based contracts can have unpredictable effects on performance, and that they 
should be employed with care and attention.  
(Adverse) Selection  
Adverse selection is a case where asymmetric information (where different parties have 
different levels of information) leads to ‘bad’ outcomes in a market transaction, from the 
perspective of the principal. For example, if an insurance company offers a very high level of 
healthcare for a given cost it will be most attractive to individuals who have a high need of 
healthcare: the most expensive people to insure. In the healthcare setting the information 
asymmetry refers to the fact that individuals may know more about their need for healthcare 
than the insurance company. This is relevant for PbR in both the short and long run.  
In the short run, information asymmetry means that the agent will typically have a more 
accurate judgement of whether a contract is favourable than the donor. In agreements with 
national governments, the recipient will then sometimes be rewarded for improvements that 
would have happened anyway. For example, in a PbR contract with the Rwandan 
government, a large portion of the money disbursed by DFID for improvements in the 
numbers of children sitting exams appears to be related to simple demographic cohort effects 
(Clist, 2015). In competitive environments, for example where a donor is choosing between 
different NGOs, bidders will tend to have different levels of information regarding the specific 
context and the profitability of a contract. This could lead to donors rewarding NGOs for 
having better information on likely trends rather than for delivering improved results.  
In the long-run, PbR may change the type of agent that bids in competitive environments. In 
some contexts this is very positive. In a theoretical piece of research related to performance-
based pay for teachers, Lazear (2003) argues that the selection effect is one of the two major 
drivers of improvements (alongside straightforward incentive effects). In short, the best 
agents (be they individuals, NGOs or governments) benefit most from moving from a fixed 
transfer to a system where they get paid for every incremental output, as they are able to 
deliver the highest performance. This process has been observed by Falisse et al (2014), who 
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looked at a performance-based financing pilot in the health sector in Burundi. Health facilities 
and workers received income partly on the basis of the number of services offered, with some 
incentivised services being around 20 percentage points higher than control provinces. 
Interestingly, provinces that had the performance-based financing model also saw an increase 
in the number of qualified nurses. While it is not possible to link the change in type of nurse 
to the improvement, the authors report that qualified nurses heard that they could increase 
their earnings by moving into PbR-provinces. The best nurses saw increases in their salary of 
around 250% over a four-year period. This process, over time, should then see an 
improvement in the quality of nurses, as those able to effectively treat large numbers of 
patients would be most incentivised to join and remain in the profession.   
A caveat to the above argument is that the ‘best agent’ here is defined as those that efficiently 
produce measured performance, not necessarily those that produce the thing the donor really 
cares about. In an Indonesian field experiment, Banuri and Keefer (2016) found support for 
the common idea that greater pay will attract individuals that are less concerned with the 
donor’s overall aims. It is then possible that the efficient nurses that are discussed by Falisse 
et al (2014) are only more efficient according to measured performance, and could neglect non-
incentivised or unobservable activities that the donor also cares about. This brings us neatly 
to the quality of the performance measure, discussed in the next section.  
3. Measures 
Payment by results puts a great deal of emphasis on the measure and associated tariff, as they 
determine the amount of aid disbursed. Typical tariffs will pay for every unit against some 
baseline, for example GAVI disbursed $20 to eligible governments for each child above a 
target receiving the DTP3 vaccine in their country (Lim et al, 2008). Because it determines the 
amount disbursed, the quality of the measure is the single largest determinant of whether a 
PbR project will be successful. Some measures are demonstrably poor, because they do not 
measure what they are intended to. For example, DFID Ethiopia agreed tariffs for the number 
of additional students passing and sitting an exam (Department for International 
Development, 2014b). The inclusion of the ‘number of passers’ was motivated by a desire to 
incentivise higher standards, but the exam is strictly norm-referenced: a set proportion of 
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sitters should always pass. In essence, the agreed tariff is just paying for all sitters and a 
proportion of those sitters, and cannot incentivise higher standards. While identifying poor 
measures is quite easy, the definition of a good measure is more technical, and relies on 
insights from a range of fields.  
Insights from the P-A model 
The principal-agent model focuses, unsurprisingly, on the characteristics of the principal and 
agent, but does have some insights regarding the measure itself. It distinguishes between 
actions (which only the recipient can observe) and outcomes (which both parties can observe), 
recognising that there is an information asymmetry. For example, a donor may not be able to 
observe the time and money that an NGO devotes to achieving the donor's goal of, say, 
vaccination coverage. They can, however, observe the outcomes by measuring vaccination 
rates or, ultimately, rates of infection. In the PbR context, there will tend to be a verification 
cost for observing the outcome, as measures take on legal ramifications in many PbR contracts. 
Some of the costs of verification are likely to have additional benefits in that they may increase 
the reliability of data collection systems (in anticipation of verification) but these are likely to 
be small. Contexts in which verification costs are high are probably unsuitable for PbR, but 
this is one of the easier and more tangible costs to predict ahead of agreeing a performance 
based contract. The added cost of verification should be balanced against the cost of tracking 
input costs, assuming that these are reduced in practice.  
The credibility of the verification is important as agents will tend to have an incentive to 
misreport. Lim et al (2008) and Sandefur and Glassman (2015) present evidence that GAVI's 
use of a PbR contract (where recipient governments where paid on the basis of the number of 
vaccinations administered) caused national data systems to over-report their progress.  The 
evidence comes by comparing (non)incentivised data sources for (non)incentivised diseases 
before and after the GAVI agreement. This kind of triangulation goes far beyond what is 
currently understood as verification, and will typically not be possible in a timely manner as 
it depends upon the existence of robust and unincentivised data sources. This research then 
raises concerns over the extent to which reported success can be believed in cases where 
triangulation is not possible: ‘fool’s gold’ may be common.  
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The other major insight taken directly from the P-A model relates to the ratio of signal to noise, 
or, in other words, the extent to which the recipient can actually affect the outcome. Where 
the recipient has low control it will tend to be rewarded due to good luck and punished due 
to misfortune more often, regardless of their own actions. The ratio of signal (recipient effort) 
to noise (other factors) then influences the strength of incentive to succeed and the 
disincentive for failure. The type of results that are more closely controlled by recipients will 
tend to be intermediate outputs (e.g. the number of teachers trained) rather than final 
outcomes (e.g. the number of educated citizens) and tend to be more suitable for PbR (at least 
in this element).  
Multitask model 
The multitask model is a useful tool for thinking about PbR measures from the literature on 
incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Gibbons (1998, p.118) argues the performance 
measure in the P-A model is “misleadingly simple”, as it assumes everything that the donor 
cares about can be summarised in a simple number. The multitask model recognises that the 
underlying goals of the donor will seldom be fully captured by any one measure.  
Imagine a performance-based contract where a donor agrees to disburse aid to a recipient 
government based on student completion rates, motivated by the underlying goal of an 
educated and productive workforce (this example is discussed in a book length-treatment on 
Cash on Delivery Aid by Birdsall et al, 2011). As shown in Figure 1, the recipient government 
has two possible actions: he can either increase the quality of education provided or strongly 
discourage drop out. Intuitively it is obvious that both actions may be desirable but the 
balance between the two actions will be different, depending on whether the recipient focuses 
on the performance measure (completion) or the unobserved true outcome of interest 
(learning).  
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Figure 1: The Multitask Model 
 
Intuitively, one may think that the important consideration with a performance measure is 
that it is highly correlated with the latent variable, meaning that completion would be a good 
indicator if it is correlated with learning. However, the multitask model shows us that being 
correlated before a measure is incentivised is not enough: it must remain so afterwards. In our 
example, the conceptual problem is that increasing quality may be expensive, and have a 
smaller effect on completion than it does on learning outcomes. Discouraging drop out may 
be much easier to do, and have a larger effect on completion rates. Therefore, the recipient 
government could most easily improve completion rates by focusing on drop outs, which may 
actually harm learning (for example, if disruptive students are kept in classes). More 
generally, a perfect measure would be perfectly aligned and incentivise exactly the right mix 
of activities while the worst measure would only be altered by activities that have no effect on 
the latent goal. The quality of the measure is then determined by which case it resembles: and 
can be summarised as the alignment between the measures and latent goal, which is given by 
the angle θ (see Baker 2002 for more).  
The preceding argument can be recast in standard economic language, by noting simply that 
the correlation between a performance measure and an outcome is observed ceteris paribus 
i.e. holding other things constant. Once the performance measure is selected things are likely 
to change, and the previously observed correlation may no longer hold as an agent's 
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behaviour adapts to incentives, and the associated ratio of the two actions. Goodhart's law, 
cited by Eldridge and Palmer (2009, p.164), sums this up neatly: “when a measure becomes a 
target, it ceases to be a good measure”. These insights have empirical support: Courty and 
Marchke (2008) tested the covariance of performance measures and proxies for the latent 
variable, and found that when a measure is incentivised it has lower covariance with the true 
latent variable. The insight of the multitask model is that the measure is good not if it is 
normally correlated with the latent variable but rather if it rewards the right mix of actions 
even after it is incentivised.  
The title of Kerr's (1975) article neatly summaries the pessimistic nature of one strand of the 
literature regarding poor performance measures: ‘On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping 
for B’. If the performance measure is poor, the principal does not have many options to 
improve its lot. The model simply states that in cases of low alignment the PbR element of an 
aid agreement should be low as weak incentives are more efficient than strong incentives for 
the wrong action (Lazear, 2000). Neal (2011) takes a more positive line in such situations, 
arguing that some level of performance-related incentive is still beneficial as long as neither 
action has a detrimental effect on either variable. This has a solid conceptual basis, but rests 
on several assumptions including a lack of alignment between the preferences of the principal 
and the agent. 
Gaming and Distorted Incentives  
The multitask model provides a framework with which to think about gaming, and 
distinguish it from more complicated unintended consequences. Baker (2002, p.729) discusses 
a good example of gaming from Berg (1975): Lincoln Electric abandoned paying a piece rate 
to their secretaries based on the number of key strokes when it was discovered they were 
using lunchtime to tap a single key repetitively. This is clearly gaming as the repetitive 
tapping of a key had an influence on the performance measure (the number of keystrokes) but 
not on the latent variable. We can confidently call this gaming as in this case the action served 
no useful purpose. However, while gaming receives a lot of attention, there is a different class 
of unintended effects that are less morally suspect but are probably more important and 
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widespread. These are effects which may not be obvious when considering only a static model 
or situation, and are often unintended and unforeseen consequences.  
To illustrate distortion consider two examples. First, Sylvia et al (2013) used a randomised 
controlled trial to study the effects of incentivising Chinese schools to fight anaemia, where 
control schools where given information and a block grant. Both groups saw anaemia rates 
fall, but incentivised schools also had lower test scores for healthy children. The authors are 
unsure, but think that the provision of school feeding programs may have negatively affected 
the amount of teaching time in PbR schools. This situation fits the multitask framework 
perfectly: the latent goal may have been to improve learning outcomes, but the chosen 
measure caused a distortion in the incentives such that school feeding was emphasised. This 
caused the desired effect in the indicator (anaemia) but as other actions (teaching) were 
neglected the end result was actually lower learning outcomes.  
Second, Olken, Onishi and Wong (2014) study a health and education intervention in 
Indonesian neighbourhoods in which groups received either block grants or performance-
related disbursements. PbR was significantly more effective than a standard aid transfer in 
increasing certain indicators over the incentivised 18 month period, but these increases were 
not present after the program ended (30 months). PbR led to increases in outcomes that were 
visible in the short run without any improvements that were noticeable in the long run, as 
incentivised activities were front-loaded without any change in the total package of activities. 
In the multitask framework, this can be understood as a shift towards actions which affect the 
performance measure in the short run, while leaving the latent goal unaffected.  
Tensions in the choice of measure 
There are two main tensions to consider when choosing the measure, and both deal with cases 
where various desirable features may not be possible simultaneously. The first relates to 
where ‘on the results chain’ a measure is targeted. A measure could be aimed at ultimate 
outcomes such as a healthy or educated workforce or at inputs such as numbers of 
vaccinations administered or children attending school. There is a fundamental tension in this 
decision which is rarely acknowledged. In order to minimise distortion and maximise 
recipient discretion, a measure would be targeted at ultimate outcomes. This would make it 
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easier for the measure to capture genuine successes while allowing the recipient the space to 
innovate. However, an attempt to maximise recipient control by choosing a measure with a 
low signal-to-noise ratio would lead to a measure of inputs. If inputs are measured the 
perceived financial incentive is higher, as it limits cases of being rewarded for good fortune 
and punished for bad luck. These different sets of goals cannot be satisfied simultaneously, 
and so the design of a PbR contract must trade off concerns over distortion with those over 
technical capacity and recipient control. 
The second tension apparent in the choice of the measure relates to choosing activities for 
which the recipient has the ‘right amount’ of intrinsic motivation. As argued previously, if the 
recipient has complete intrinsic motivation (alignment of goals with the donor) the extra PbR 
contract holds no advantages over a fixed contract. However, if there is not enough intrinsic 
motivation results are more likely to be short lived or illusory. To give a micro example of the 
temporal aspect, consider evidence from Burundi. Bertone and Meessen (2012, p.7) state that 
over time a bonus that had once incentivised effort became expected regardless of 
performance, and health workers “reportedly spent time on endless discussions to obtain it, 
rather than in the provision of services to the population.” The changing perception of the 
incentive is a cause for concern, if PBR success is to be sustainable. Regarding the possible 
illusory nature of improvements when recipients have low intrinsic motivation, consider the 
multitask model introduced earlier. Neal (2011) introduces the idea of intrinsic motivation 
into this framework, stating that there are norms dictating the amount of time or effort 
devoted to different actions and that deviation from these are (increasingly) costly. Where 
intrinsic motivation for the underlying goal of the donor is high, these norms will also be 
higher, limiting negative distortionary effects. However, if intrinsic motivation is low then 
there is greater scope for distortionary effects and illusory measured gains.ii 
4. Principal 
In the same way that the characteristics of the agent and measure should be taken into account 
in any analysis of PbR, the principal’s own constraints should be considered. While PbR 
attempts to provide clear rules that govern disbursement, ignoring the pragmatic constraints 
upon a donor would be naïve, especially as donors do not have a history of enforcing their 
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own rules. Svensson's (2000) analysis of conditionality argued that the donor's inequality 
aversion stymied attempts to withhold aid, and it is not clear that PbR contracts furnish 
donors with this technology. Furthermore, donors own financial systems often make non-
disbursal difficult as there are few mechanisms for reallocation of funds. In many cases the 
specific PbR contract may not be paid out upon, but if the aid is re-purposed for the same 
recipient using another modality the spirit of PbR is lost.  
Furthermore, the practical difficulty of withholding aid can be seen in the following quote:       
“Contingencies are still necessary, however, for events beyond the recipient's 
control that could interfere with schooling or disrupt testing - such as major 
natural disasters or declines in the world price of an important export. While 
countries facing such crises may require additional aid, it is important for those 
funds to come through other channels.”  
Birdsall et al (2011, p.63) 
In other words, when factors beyond the recipient's control affect their performance, other 
forms of aid should be used to compensate the recipient. However, the practical matter of 
deciding which factors are beyond the recipient's control and how much to compensate is 
difficult. Does a 1% fall in the world price of a country’s largest export warrant a payment? 
What if the donor believes the recipient has been unwise in not diversifying its export market: 
should that be taken into consideration? This is important as there are many possible 
confounding factors which could conceivably be claimed as mitigating circumstances. In 
short, the pragmatic considerations that have stymied other attempts to introduce 
conditionality into aid (e.g. inequality aversion and the difficulty in separating effort from 
conditions) are not circumvented by PbR.  
While it is helpful to analyse a PbR contract in isolation, in the real world a PbR contract cannot 
be separated from other concurrent or potential aid agreements. While PbR itself may have 
clear rules on when and whether to disburse, there is much less certainty around other 
contracts. The measure on which the PbR contract is contingent could also be taken as a 
barometer of success in that country or with that NGO, and so the rewards for achieving 
measured success could have wider consequences. This magnifies the perceived incentive to 
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achieve the incentivised goal, with the implication that lower-powered incentives may be 
sufficient.  
Another pragmatic constraint for most donors is the time horizon they are able to contract 
over, which has potentially large effects on the likelihood of innovation in a PbR contract. 
Birdsall et al (2011, p.20) suggest a minimum contract period of five years, but the majority of 
current agreements have a much shorter length (Holzapfel and Janus; 2015). It is not attractive 
for donors to remove the flexibility that comes with shorter contracts, and political constraints 
make this difficult. It is easy to see that when donors are not able to commit themselves for 
sufficiently long time periods, the likelihood that the recipient undertakes investments that 
take longer to come to fruition will decrease. This concern becomes binding if we make 
plausible assumptions regarding the time between an investment and its return. Recall the 
example from the multitask model where a recipient is being incentivised to increase its 
completion rates. The two possible actions in the stylised example are either to improve 
quality or to discourage drop out. The time needed for improvements in teacher quality to 
lead to increases in completion is high, but the required time for a mechanistic clamp-down 
on drop out and repetition is relatively low. In this case a donor which agrees a short-term 
contract would make it more likely that the less good action would be taken. The constraint 
for donors over the time horizon seems to point towards more input-based measures being 
used, or to illusory success in outcome measures.  
Does PbR lead to greater innovation? 
PbR’s attractiveness is sometimes fuelled by a recognition that donors do not understand how 
results are best achieved. Proponents of PbR argue that it dominates more traditional forms 
of aid where the recipient is likely to know (or be able to discover) a more efficient method of 
achieving a goal (Perakis and Savedoff, 2015; Andrews at al., 2013). The logic is attractive: 
donors will typically give project aid with an end goal in mind, and a related set of activities 
will be prescribed. Recipients are held accountable for their use of funds against the prescribed 
activities rather than against the achievement of the goal.  As such, where donors prescribe 
the wrong activities there is a loss in autonomy and, ultimately, efficiency. Such prescriptions 
would appear to diminish the effectiveness of aid wherever the recipient has greater 
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knowledge than the donor. The counter argument is given by O’Brien and Kanbur (2014, 
p.349), who explain that the World Bank have deliberately chosen to include prescriptive 
process measures as a way of “transmitting technical expertise.” PbR can then be used either 
on outputs or outcomes, with differing views over the likely innovation and prescriptions 
needed.  
The argument that PbR should be used in order to provide greater innovation is worth 
examining in greater detail. Essentially there are two assumptions: that PbR will lead to 
autonomy, and that autonomy will lead to innovation. There is some empirical support for 
the idea that greater autonomy correlates with project success (Honig, 2014), but that same 
research finds that PbR contracts have not led to greater autonomy. Where the counter-factual 
aid contract is General Budget Support or a block grant, the likely additional autonomy of 
PbR is not obvious. More generally, it is unclear at this stage whether the lack of an increase 
in autonomy is due to PbR’s current implementation or an inherent feature. Huillery and 
Seban (2014) offer useful empirical evidence: 96 health areas in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo were randomly assigned to a receive funding according to either a fixed or results-
contingent formula. In keeping with a situation of incomplete alignment discussed above, 
health workers under the results-contingent treatment expended greater effort. However, this 
effort was ‘more of the same’, and unsuccessful to the extent that revenue was lower for health 
facilities under the results-contingent regime. In this particular case autonomy did not lead to 
innovation, and authors speculate that the complicated goals were a factor.  
The literature on the optimal incentive contracts for innovation is useful in explaining why 
PbR contracts do not guarantee innovation, even when autonomy is achieved. Manso (2011) 
presents evidence consistent with the view that reward for long-term success needs to be 
combined with short term tolerance, or even reward, of failure. This early tolerance (or 
reward) of failure means that agents have the space required to experiment with different 
strategies, freeing them to discover the most successful approaches. Huillery and Seban (2014) 
suggest that the health professionals simply did not know how else to provide their services, 
and the contract did not enable them to experiment in a low-risk setting. Perhaps more 
surprisingly the importance of allowing (or rewarding) early failure is illustrated by Ariely et 
al (2009), who present evidence that very high rewards have a detrimental effect on 
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performance for individuals. The psychological effects of large incentives are detrimental, as 
excessive ‘arousal’ in individuals causes poorer performance. The typical PbR contract does 
not currently seem to be in danger of having excessively high rewards, but neither do they 
resemble the optimum situation of early tolerance for failure. The evidence of Huillery and 
Seban (2014) seems more typical, with short time horizons that have two negative effects. First, 
an agent does not have the space to learn and experiment without financial consequences. 
Second, the reward for discovering the optimal solution is low as the contract is not long 
enough to recoup any experimentation costs.  
An implicit assumption in much of the discussion above is that an unsuccessful project does 
not represent success for the donor, even if it incurs no costs. Imagine, for example, an 
overconfident NGO signing a contract that is later found to have tariffs that are too low, and 
so it simply decides to not try to meet the objectives. In this case the donor has allocated funds 
for a given use and so must pay the opportunity costs for the public funds; this is termed the 
risk of non-performance (Ghosh et al, 2012, p.16). It may be that the donor would rather have 
agreed a more generous contract if it had known the true situation. Furthermore, transfer from 
principal to agent is never complete as the principal is still liable to suffer reputation risk 
(Vivid Economics, 2013). It is easy to envisage that the donor’s reputation would suffer 
because a given result has not been delivered, even if it incurs no direct costs.  
5. Discussion 
The preceding analysis has mostly considered PbR relative to block grants, but considering 
them relative to more traditional forms of conditionality is also informative. There are three 
main areas in which PbR differs from ex post/ex ante conditionality: the timing of different 
steps, the ease of enforcing the conditions and the types of conditions used. First, on the timing 
of different steps, traditional conditionality starts off contracting an aid recipient by setting 
out conditions and committing an amount of aid. In theory these steps are followed by 
reforms, with aid only disbursed if the donor judges the reforms were sufficient. In practice, 
many donors have tended to disburse regardless of whether conditions have been met 
(Kanbur, 2006; Koeberle, 2003; Svensson, 2000). The shift towards selectivity can be seen as 
moving any reform process to before (or outside) the aid contract, with the selection of 
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recipients consisting of a judgement of whether the existing policy and governance 
environment is suitable. Because of this shift in ordering, there is no reason why commitment 
and disbursal should differ: ex post conditionality sidesteps the difficulty of enforcing 
conditions.   
It is clear that PbR shares elements with both ex ante and ex post conditionality. At first glance, 
PbR resembles traditional conditionality because the contracting step comes first. However, 
whereas as traditional conditionality offers a lump sum (e.g. ‘$5 million, as long as governance 
reforms are enacted’), PbR offers a tariff (e.g. ‘$50 per child educated’). This means the 
contracting stage is qualitatively quite different, with PbR offering a clear formula to 
determine the aid to be disbursed rather than an expected amount. The closest that ex post 
conditional aid contracts come to PbR is perhaps the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s 
model (Öhler, Nunnenkamp and Dreher, 2012). While there is no formal contract at the outset, 
the ‘rules of the game’ are clearly set out: to be eligible to receive funds a recipient must be in 
the top half of performance in its peer group (judged by 17 independent indicators). This 
comes close to PbR because recipients are essentially being rewarded for ‘results’ in a broadly 
predictable fashion. However, in the MCC model performance only affects eligibility rather 
than directly determining the size of aid receipts.  
Second, different conditional contracts will differ in how easy they are for the donor to 
enforce. As noted, ex ante conditional contracts have been difficult for donors to enforce, and 
ex post conditionality requires no commitment as commitment and disbursal decisions are 
taken at the same time. The question is then whether PbR will be easier to enforce than ex ante 
conditional contracts, with several reasons why PbR is more easily enforced in at least a 
narrow sense. PbR is so clear in its tariff, with measured and verified progress, that donors 
will find it difficult to deviate from the specific disbursal mandated by the measured progress. 
It is also incremental, which may ease the difficulty of withholding an entire amount of aid in 
a binary decision on whether reforms have been satisfactorily implemented. However, in a 
broader sense, it is too early to conclude that PbR allows greater enforcement of conditionality. 
While PbR contracts may be followed to the letter, the spirit of this conditionality will be 
undermined if undisbursed funds are reallocated to the same recipient in a different form.  
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Third, there is variety in the types of conditions that different conditional contracts can use. 
Ex ante conditionality has traditionally used conditions of many types and forms, from 
specific conditions over tariff removal to broad assessments of public sector reforms. Smets 
and Knack (2016) note that the World Bank has shifted to using fewer conditions (and an ex 
post mind set), but they recognise there is little research on the type of conditions in current 
use. Regardless, PbR is by its nature more data intensive, as it needs fine-grained data tracking 
the level of results in a given sector. PbR requires details on things like the specific numbers 
of school enrolments, children reading to a certain standard, vaccinations, hospital visits, 
wells built, or police trained. To be useable, this data also needs to be accurate, verifiable and 
timely. Given current data standards, it is clear that many discussions over whether PbR 
should be used will be hypothetical as the relevant data simply does not exist.  
Where data for PbR conditionality are available, there is an important issue relating to the 
types of conditions used that is generally neglected. Because PbR focuses on specific and 
measureable achievements, PbR lends itself to an apolitical and technocratic approach. 
Advocates of PbR see this as a strength, arguing that it is well-suited to fragile states as it has 
few pre-conditions and can reward specific competence (Birdsall et al, 2011). However, PbR 
will do little to reassure critics that see aid as undermining the rights of the poor by 
strengthening ‘benevolent dictators’ who are able to deliver specific development results 
without deep-rooted development (see Temple, 2010 and Easterly, 2013 for related 
arguments). While ex post and ex ante conditionality have controversial and contested effects 
on the general governance context in recipient countries, PbR has an inherent tendency to 
focus instead on specific achievements and ignore the broader context.  
Of the three factors that distinguish PbR from other types of conditional aid, it is this third 
factor (the type of conditions used, and their consequences in terms of policy influence) that 
is the most important in deciding between modalities. The availability of data will often 
preclude an attempt to use PbR and any differences in contract enforceability are currently 
unproven. However, the type of conditions that can be used are inherent features of different 
types of aid. The decision of which kind of conditionality to use does not just depend upon 
the conditions of the recipient country, but interact with the influence and perspective of the 
donor. The decision will ultimately be based on political economy judgements over likely 
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policy and governance influence, with different donors likely to come to very different 
decisions.  
The Four Ironies of PbR 
Having discussed the agent, measure and principal, this subsection considers PbR in the 
round by discussing four ironies of PbR. The first irony of PbR is that it is often motivated by 
a desire to be more data-driven, but will tend to diminish the information content of the 
available data. Success could be measured where there is none (consider the examples of 
Sandefur & Glassman, 2015; Syvlia et al., 2013; Olken, Onishi and Wong, 2014). While the 
research cited here is able to document this ‘fool’s gold’ effect, in the majority of real world 
PbR contracts we will simply never know with certainty whether measured success was 
genuine.  
The second irony of PbR is that citizens’ demands for proof of aid effectiveness may make 
PbR more popular, but ultimately lead to less desirable outcomes. Citizens may have aid 
spending justified in terms of illusory success if measures are susceptible to distortion. 
Alternatively, they may have gains which would have happened anyway attributed to a 
particular aid intervention. Because PbR contracts only disburse on measured improvements, 
donors will additionally be able to claim greater value for money. However, wherever there 
is a mismatch between a given indicator and the latent goals of the donor, such 
(non-)payments will be misleading.  
A third irony of PbR is that while PbR is often motivated by an acknowledgement that the 
recipient may have more information than the donor, good PbR contracts may require even 
more information than a standard block grant. The donor would ideally be aware of the 
possible distortions of choosing different measures (which requires knowing the mix of 
actions for both the latent goal and possible measures), the suitability of the time horizon 
(which requires knowing the likely number of iterations required and the length of the 
feedback loop), and the correct tariff level. In some situations, PbR will be more demanding 
for the donor than traditional alternatives.   
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The fourth irony relates more to aid in general: aid works best where it is needed least (e.g. 
Deaton, 2013). That is, aid is most effective in countries that already have characteristics such 
as functioning property rights, a strong legal system, a political ability to manage disputes 
and good infrastructure. For aid donors, this creates a quandary as they face a trade-off 
between aid being ‘effective’ and being ‘pro-poor’. PbR does not solve this problem, but rather 
reinforces it. As de Renzio and Woods (2008, pp.2-3) argue, successful countries will receive 
more aid under PbR  but “…this still leaves open the issue of what to do with non-performing 
countries where lots of poor people live, which might be in dire need of additional resources. 
Should they be disregarded?” The inherent tension between a desire to reward performance 
and alleviate desperate situations is apparent. If countries with poor performance receive aid 
anyway, the incentive is lost. Conversely if these countries receive no aid then they are 
‘disregarded’. One of the reasons for this tension is the difficulty of separating effort from 
conditions (i.e. the signal-to-noise ratio is low).  
6. Conclusion  
It should now be apparent that Payment by Results does not universally dominate other forms 
of aid, nor is it universally dominated by them: it is a useful modality which should be used 
in the right circumstances. The question is then the size of the domain in which it should be 
used, and the indicators by which suitability should be judged. This article has discussed 
many factors but theoretical insights and empirical experience suggest that the most 
important prerequisites for PbR success can be summarised in three points. First, a good and 
verifiable measure of something continuous that we really care about. Second, a recipient 
which may undervalue the related improvement, has a reasonable chance of affecting it and 
is not excessively worried by the proposed payment structure. Third, a donor which is able to 
design and enforce the contract in a reasonable timeframe. These are not universally 
applicable or guarantors of PbR success, but they do capture the most important indicators of 
PbR suitability.  
While the three characteristics influence the suitability of an individual PbR contract, the 
measure also determines the quality of the evidence for PbR as a whole. Put simply, bad 
measures mislead. This article discusses cases where success was measured and led to a 
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disbursal of aid, even when the success appears to have been a temporary illusion (Olken, 
Onishi and Wong, 2014), spurious (Sandefur and Glassman, 2015) or at the expense of the true 
goal of the donor (Syvlia et al, 2013). If PbR is to be properly judged, evidence of its success 
will need to be robustly proven from non-incentivised data sources, which are rare. While 
there will of course be cases where PbR has a real advantage over traditional forms of aid, bad 
measures will lead to a large amount of ‘fool’s gold’ that may be indistinguishable from real 
success. Positive evidence of PbR should thus be treated with scepticism, and PbR contracts 
should only be used in the right circumstances.  
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